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ABSTRACT
We explore the causes of the dramatic rise in employee contributions to health insurance over the
past two decades. In 1982, 44% of those who were covered by their employer-provided health insurance
had their costs fully financed by their employer, but by 1998 this had fallen to 28%. We discuss the theory
of why employers might shift premiums to their employees, and empirically model the role of six factors
suggested by the theory. We find that there was a large impact of falling tax rates, rising eligibility for
insurance through the Medicaid system and through spouses, and deteriorating economic conditions (in
the late 1980s and early 1990s). We also find much more modest impacts of increased managed care
penetration and rising health care costs. Overall, this set of factors can explain about one-quarter of the
rise in employee premiums over the 1982-1996 period.







gruberj@mit.edu1Source for all figures is author’s tabulations of March Current Population Survey data.
The dominant feature of the health insurance market in the U.S. is the provision of private
health insurance through the workplace.  But the past two decades have been a period of
substantial reduction in both the scope and generosity of employer-provided health insurance.  In
1982, roughly 80% of workers were covered by employer-provided health insurance.  By 1998,
this had fallen to 73%.  Similarly, in 1982, 44% of those who were covered by their employer-
provided health insurance had insurance that was fully financed by their employer.  But by 1998,
this had fallen to 28%.
1
There has been a voluminous literature in recent years on the causes and consequences of
the decline in employer-provided health insurance coverage.  But there has been virtually no
work on the parallel time trend of declining employer payments for health insurance.  This is a
particularly glaring omission in light of recent evidence which shows that most of the time trend
in private insurance coverage appears to be reductions not in employer offering of insurance, but
in employee takeup of insurance conditional on offering (Cooper and Schone, 1997; Farber and
Levy, 2000). Thus, the key dimension along which employers appear to be adjusting their health
insurance spending is through the generosity of what they contribute.  Moreover, this raises the
possibility that it is reductions in employer generosity that are responsible for declining insurance
coverage.
In this paper, we attempt to model the set of factors that may be driving employers to shift
their health insurance costs to their employees.  We begin by discussing the theory of why
employers might shift premiums to their employees.  There are two classes of explanations.  The
first is that employers are shifting premiums in order to induce employees to choose the cost2
effective option from the range of insurance choices offered by the employer.  The second is that
premium sharing results from imperfect worker sorting across firms; with heterogeneity in tastes
among co-workers, premium contributions become a useful tool for separating worker types.  By
requiring contributions, the firm can provide insurance only to those who demand it, and can pass
the savings back to employees in the form of higher wages.
We then turn to estimating the role of a number of factors which fit into these categories
of explanations, most of which also have the attractive feature that they operated most strongly in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the period over which the shift from employer to employee
financing was most pronounced.  Our summary for the first explanation is the rise in managed
care penetration.  A key determinant of employer premium sharing should be the range of choices
offered by the employer; as there are more managed care options available in a state, then there
will be more incentive to make employees bear insurance costs on the margin in order to
motivate them to choose the low cost plan.
The second and third factors are the rise in spousal labor supply and the expansion of
eligibility for the public Medicaid insurance program for women and children.  A key prediction
of the imperfect sorting model is that, as there are more outside insurance options available to
workers, firms should increase employee contributions to insurance.  Both of these factors
represent a rise in such outside options: more spousal labor supply means more opportunity for
spouses to be covered by insurance; and more Medicaid entitlement means more chance for
coverage by public insurance.
The fourth factor is health insurance costs.  In the presence of workplace heterogeneity
and imperfect individual-specific wage shifting, rising medical costs will increase the pressure on3
firms to shift the costs of insurance to their workers.  Likewise, the reductions in marginal tax
rates through the tax reforms of the 1980s could be playing an important causal role.  A central
feature of employer-provided health insurance in the U.S. is its subsidization through the tax
code.  If employees are paid in wages, they must pay taxes on those wages; but, if paid in health
insurance, it is tax free.  Since employee contributions for health insurance are usually made in a
post-tax form, higher tax rates would lead to a stronger incentive for employers to finance these
costs rather than shifting premiums to employees.  Thus, tax subsidies to insurance are the fifth
factor.
The final factor we consider is cyclical conditions.  The most dramatic rise in employee
premium sharing was at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s, during which the
economy went through a significant downturn.  A variety of models, such as recruitment models
with imperfect worker understanding of wage shifting, or rent-sharing between workers and
firms that is partially through insurance premium sharing, would suggest that when the economy
performs worse, there is more premium shifting to employees.  
We investigate the role of these six factors using the only nationally representative annual
data on premium sharing that covers this period of rapidly rising employee premium
contributions: the Current Population Survey (CPS).  These data provide only a crude measure of
premium sharing, based on a question of covered employees as to whether their employers pay
all, some, or none of premiums. Compared to more comprehensive sources available for
particular years, however, these crude data capture both variation across jobs/places and over
time in the propensity to share costs between employers and employees.  Moreover, this
disadvantage is counterbalanced by the significant advantage that we can match to these data job4
and locational variation in our measures of interest.  Based on these matches, we can investigate
the role of these factors in driving the rise in employee premium sharing.
Our results suggest that this set of factors are all related to employer contribution
decisions, but the results for some of the factors (spousal labor supply, taxes, Medicaid and
unemployment rates) are much more robust than others (managed care penetration and medical
costs).  Interestingly, many of these factors changed significantly in the late 1980s and early
1990s in a manner that is consistent with rising employee contributions.  We find that the time
trend in these influences corresponds quite strikingly to that of employee contributions, but that
overall these factors can only explain about a quarter of the rise in employee contributions over
the entire 1982-1996 period.
Our paper proceeds as follows.  We begin, in Part I, by providing background on
employer and employee contributions for health insurance.  We also discuss heuristically the
theoretical issues involved in thinking about the tradeoff between employer and employee-
financed insurance payments.  Part II lays out our data and empirical framework for testing
hypotheses about this shift.  Part III presents our results, and assesses the extent to which the
factors we investigate can explain this time series trend.  Part IV concludes.
Part I: Background 
Time Series Trends
Group health insurance provided through the workplace has been the dominant source of
private health insurance coverage in the U.S. at least since an IRS ruling in the 1940s that health
insurance costs were deductible from employer costs, but were not taxable income to employees.  5
2There was a major redesign of the health insurance questions in the March 1995 CPS
that results in a significant upward jump in the share of the population with group coverage.  We
have assumed that coverage was flat from 1993 to 1994 and used the ratio of these years to
reverse benchmark the earlier figures.  Our regression models below will all contain year
dummies to capture such shifts in survey methodology.
In 1998, over 90% of the privately insured received their coverage through employers.  
But, as noted in the introduction, employer provided coverage has been declining
precipitously over the past two decades.  Figure 1 graphs the share of workers who have group
coverage over time.
2  Coverage was flat until 1982, then slowly declined until 1988, when the
decline was rapid before stabilizing after 1992.  Over the entire period, group coverage declined
by 7 percentage points, or almost 10%.  This significant decline is the primary driver behind the
sizeable rise in the share of the non-elderly without any health coverage, although this rise in
uninsurance is smaller than the decline in private coverage due to the mitigating role of
Medicaid.
Several recent studies have attempted to decompose this decline in employer coverage. 
Cooper and Schone (1997) find that the decline over the 1987-1996 period is completely driven
by reduced employee takeup of employer-provided coverage; they estimate that firm offering of
insurance actually rose over this period.  Farber and Levy (2000) also estimate that offering has
risen between 1988 and 1997, and that the decline in coverage can be attributed to both reduced
insurance takeup and reduced eligibility for insurance among those offered.
Why has insurance takeup declined over time?  One reason may be the significant
increase in required employee contributions towards employer-provided health insurance.  Figure
2 superimposes the decline in the share of employers paying all of the cost of employer-provided
coverage, from the CPS, on the decline in employer coverage over this period.  The series are6
normalized to fit on the same scale, and they show remarkable consistency over time, with both
series flat until the early 1980s, slowly declining until 1987, rapidly declining over the next five
years, and then flattening out again.  The correlation between the series is 0.98, and the residual
correlation after partialing a time trend out of both series is 0.66.  A time series regression of
group coverage against the share of employers paying all of the costs of health insurance yields a
coefficient of 0.44 (0.02), and the relationship is significant even when controlling for time trend,
with a coefficient of 0.36 (0.10).  
Micro-data evidence on the impact of employer contribution policy on employee
insurance decisions has not, to date, yielded evidence consistent with this time series correlation. 
Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin (1997) and Blumberg and Nichols (2001) both model employee
takeup as a function of employer premium sharing.  Both papers find that there is little impact of
employee premiums on insurance takeup decisions, with the highest estimated elasticities in the
range of -0.1.  This evidence is not fully convincing, as employer contribution policies may
themselves be endogenous to tastes for employee insurance takeup.  The bias from this potential
endogeneity is not obvious ex ante.  If employees who are likely to take up select firms with low
employee premiums, this would lead to an upward bias to the estimated elasticity of takeup.  But
if employers cover a larger share of health insurance premiums when employees don’t have tastes
for insurance coverage (either through paternalism or to meet insurer requirements on employee
takeup), then this could lead to a downward bias.   Regardless, this striking time series
correspondence is highly suggestive and highlights the value of understanding what drove the
trend towards employees paying more for their health insurance.7
Analytical Framework
In this section, we lay out an analytical framework for thinking about the determinants of
employee premium sharing.  We do not propose a new model here, but rather summarize and
extend some of the insights of Dranove, Spier and Baker (2000) and Levy (1998).
As noted by Pauly (1986), the presence of any employee contributions suggests imperfect
worker sorting across firms, because in general employer contributions for health insurance are
excluded from taxation while employee contributions are not.  In a growing share of firms with
IRS Section 125 plans, employee contributions can also be excluded from taxation, but such
protection of employee contributions is far from complete.  The data on the prevalence of such
arrangements is sketchy.  The most recent available data, from a survey of employers by the
Kaiser Family Foundation, suggests that half of all workers are in firms that offered such flexible
benefit plans.  These data also suggest that in the last year of our sample, 1996, the figure was
higher (65%) (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2000).  At the same time, earlier surveys by the Bureau
of Labor Statistics suggest a much lower prevalence.  Data on large firms from the Bureau of
Labor Statistic’s Employee Benefit Survey (EBS) show that in 1993 only 32% of workers in
large firms had tax free employee contributions, and in 1992 only 20% of workers in small firms
had such arrangements.  
In principle, every firm should also set up a Section 125 plan to further maximize the size
of the pie by making employee contributions pre-tax as well.  The reason for less than full
coverage of this generous tax benefit in practice is unclear, but some of it may have to do with
extensive IRS regulation of these arrangements to ensure that they are not abused.  For example,
the regulations state that no more than 25% of the benefits of a plan can be attributed to any8
“highly compensated” employee, essentially ruling out the availability of section 125 plans for
very small firms.  Moreover, there are strict and complicated rules that limit the flexibility of
employees to switch sources of insurance coverage during the year if they are paying their health
insurance contributions on a pre-tax basis. 
Levy (1997) highlights two possible explanations for the existence of employee
contributions.  The first is the “fixed subsidy” model, whereby employers with multiple
insurance plans ask their employees to contribute funds towards insurance in order to incentivize
employees to choose the lowest cost insurance plan.  If this were the only motivation for
employee contributions, employers would contribute the amount of the minimum cost plan, and
employers with only one plan would never have employee contributions.  In fact, as Levy (1997)
points out, the second of these conditions does not hold in practice: more than half of firms with
only one plan require an employee contribution.  Overall, she finds that only about one-sixth of
employee contributions are paid by workers who have the option of a cheaper plan with no
contribution required.
Alternative explanations for employee contributions rely on imperfect worker sorting
across firms, and Levy (1997) and Dranove, Spier, and Baker (2000) present two different
models of this imperfect sorting.  The key notion behind these models is that there is not perfect
worker-by-worker shifting of insurance costs to wages, so that with heterogeneity in tastes
premium contributions become a useful tool for separating worker types.  By requiring
contributions, the firm can provide insurance only to those who demand it, and can pass the
savings back to employees in the form of higher wages.
Models such as these have a number of interesting predictions; we follow here Dranove,9
Spier and Baker’s discussion of comparative statics.  First, in the absence of taxation, there
should be 100% employee contributions for insurance, to maximize the ability to separate those
who want and do not want insurance.  As the tax rate rises, employee contributions fall, due to
the tax subsidy to employer spending only.  Second, as the premium rises, employee
contributions rise, as the value of sorting to the firm is increasing.  Third, as outside insurance
options increase, employee contributions rise, since there is more possibility of shifting
employees to other sources of coverage, raising the wages that can be paid to employees. 
These hypotheses have been the subject of some limited testing in these previous articles. 
Levy (1997) shows that contributions fall with a proxy for insurance demand, worker age, and
that firms where workers have higher tax rates are less likely to require a contribution.  Dranove,
Spier and Baker (2000) show that contributions are larger at smaller firms, are higher for firms
with more female workers, are lower at firms with more older male workers, and are higher at
firms with more part-time workers (a proxy for higher premium costs).
One difficulty with previous tests, however, is distinguishing the worker sorting story
from a simple alternative model that high quality jobs provide higher compensation along many
dimensions, including lower employee contributions.  Firms with more older workers, fewer
female workers, higher employee wages and thus tax rates, fewer part-time workers, and more
total employees are all the type of high quality jobs that are likely to compensate their workers
highly.  Given imperfect controls in these models for job quality, this could easily explain the
finding that such jobs require smaller employee contributions.  In the empirical work presented
below, we will endeavor through instrumental variables strategies to avoid such problems of
interpretation in our measures of determinants of employee contributions.10
Part II: Data and Empirical Framework
Data
Our primary data for this analysis is the CPS data on premium sharing used in Table 2.
As noted above, the CPS only provides information on whether the employer pays some, all, or
none of the premium.  An additional limitation is that this information is only provided
conditional on being covered by insurance, and only for the policy through which one is covered. 
We cannot condition on having insurance in our regression analysis of premium sharing, since
the factors that we examine may (and in fact, in some cases, do) have effects on the coverage
decision itself.  Therefore, our dependent variables will be unconditional, measuring (for
example) the share of all workers for whom the employer pays all the costs of health insurance. 
This variable may change for four reasons.  First, employers may shift the financing of their
health insurance plans.  Second, changes in employer offering may be differentially concentrated
in high or low employee contribution firms.  Third, changes in employee takeup may be
concentrated in differentially high or low employee contribution firms.  Finally, since this
measure refers to the plan held by the employee, employees may be moving across plans of
different contribution levels.  We will address these issues in the interpretation of our results
below.
These limitations raise fundamental issues of the applicability of our CPS results,
however: do shifts that we observe in the share of employers paying different amounts for
insurance in the CPS accurately capture shifts in employer-financing more generally?  To address
this concern, we have compared the CPS data with two other sources which have more complete
information on premium sharing.   The first is the Bureau of Labor Statistics Employee Benefits11
Survey (EBS).  The EBS surveys were sporadically carried out since the early 1980s, alternating
in recent years between small private firms, medium/large private firms, and government
workplaces.  They also provide data on the share of employees required to pay some of the cost
of their insurance; workers required to pay all of the costs are not counted as insured for their
purposes and so not included in the survey.  The EBS unfortunately only provide time series data
and no micro-data or cross-tabulations; we use the summary of their time series data from EBRI
(2000).
Table 1 provides a comparison through time of our CPS and EBS results.  We focus on
the EBS results for medium and large firms, since this is the only long time series available. 
Since the CPS only has data on firm size beginning with the 1988 survey (data for 1987), we
compare the EBS time series both to the overall CPS patterns and the patterns over all years, and
the patterns for medium and large CPS firms for 1987 onwards.
There is a rough time series correspondence between these two sources of data.  Both
sources show small changes in the early 1980s.  The EBS shows a much larger rise from 1985 to
1988 than does the CPS.  Then, from 1988 to1993, both sources show a large rise, although it is
larger in the EBS than in the CPS.  The series for family premium sharing is then fairly flat in
both data sources.  For singles, the EBS shows a much larger rise since 1993 than does the CPS.
Overall, the time series correspondence seems reasonable, particularly for family policies.
The second source is data on the share of costs of insurance for family and single plans
that are borne by firms, from unpublished data tabulations purchased from the benefits consulting
firm KPMG.  These data have the advantage that they represent a more complete measure of
premium sharing, the actual percentage of costs borne by the firm.  But we were only able to12
3The CPS data on premium sharing in the March 1995 survey, for calendar year 1994, are
not useful for our purposes since they lump together firms paying all and some of the costs of
insurance.
obtain cross-tabulations of these data, by region, industry, and firm size, and only for years from
1991 to the present.
Therefore, to compare these data, we have collapsed our CPS data into comparable year,
region, industry, and firm size cells, and examined the correlation between our CPS measure of
percent of firms paying all of premiums and the KPMG measures of percent of costs borne by
firms.  We find a correlation for family premium sharing of 0.33, and for individual premium
sharing of 0.23.  Figure 3 illustrates this correlation for family premium sharing; there is a strong
positive correlation with only two notable outliers.  The correlations suggest that the CPS data
contain real information about the degree of premium sharing.
Our CPS sample for this analysis consists of all adult workers (age 21-64).  We exclude
the self-employed and the federal government employees.  We use CPS data from March 1983
(referring to calendar year 1982) through March 1997 (referring to calendar year 1996).
3 We will
focus on several dependent variables related to firms’ health insurance provision.  The first three
are whether the firm pays some, all, or none of the costs of health insurance.  As noted above,
this is measured by a dummy which is equal to one if the employer pays all/some/none, and zero
otherwise, not conditional on whether the individual has insurance.  To interpret these findings it
is also important to measure what is happening to overall insurance coverage.  We therefore also
examine the impact of these factors on whether the worker has insurance on their job at all. 13
 Measurement of Key Independent Variables
As noted earlier, we consider the role of six key potential explanations for the time series
trend in employer contributions.  For all  concepts, we would ideally measure their impact on
insurance decisions at the level of the firm.  But the CPS does not provide any detail on an
individual’s firm composition, other than their industry, location, and (from 1988 onwards) firm
size.  
We considered two proxies for firm-based measures of our key incentive variables.  The
first was to aggregate the CPS data by various combinations of state, industry, and year in order
to form “synthetic firms”.  The alternative is to simply use the CPS respondent’s information to
form the measures, as a proxy for the characteristics of their firm.  As part of earlier work
(Gruber and Lettau, 2000), one of us has investigated both of these options using internal Bureau
of Labor Statistics data, the Employment Compensation Index (ECI) data, which gathers
information on both firm characteristics and the wages of workers in the firm.  The data show
that, for predicting the average wage of a firm, the individual worker’s wage has much more
predictive power than does an average wage formed by aggregating like firms into synthetic
firms.  We therefore create our measures at the level of the worker, as a proxy for that worker’s
firm characteristics.
As noted above, the “fixed subsidy” model of employee premium sharing suggests that
such premium sharing arises as a mechanism to ensure efficient worker choice of health plan. 
This model suggests that, as new lower cost insurance alternatives become available to workers,
firms should be more likely to pass premium costs to employees in order to cause them to choose
these lower cost alternatives.  Of course, we do not know about the insurance choices available to14
each of the workers in the CPS.  But we can proxy for the availability of these new lower cost
alternatives that might induce premium sharing by the managed care penetration rate in the
worker’s state.  This is defined as the share of privately insured persons enrolled in HMO plans
in the state, and the data come from Laurence Baker, who has compiled them for his work on
HMO penetration.  This is of course a somewhat crude proxy, but it should capture the
introduction of low cost options that would cause employers to want to induce price sensitivity in
plan choice among their employees.
In terms of the imperfect worker sorting model, we test four predictions.  The first is that
premium sharing should rise with the outside insurance options available to workers.  We use
two proxies for outside insurance options.  Our first is spousal labor force participation.  Our
regressor here is a dummy variable for whether the worker has a spouse who works at least 17
hours per week.  We explored alternative measures that tried to use information on the quality of
the spouse’s job, and the results were quite similar to those reported here.
The second measure of outside options is entitlement to Medicaid.  Here, we use the
simulation program developed for earlier work by one of us, and described in more detail in
Currie and Gruber (1996a,b), Cutler and Gruber (1996), and Gruber (2000).  This program uses
information on women and children in the CPS to compute their eligibility for Medicaid
coverage given state eligibility rules.  We then, following Cutler and Gruber (1996) use the
computed eligibility for all women and children to calculate the percentage of each family’s
medical spending that is eligible for Medicaid, which we call MES (Medicaid eligible share). 
This is calculated according to:
(2)  MES = (Σk SPENDk * ELIGk * NUMk) / (Σk SPENDk * NUMk)15
4We divide adults into those age 19-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, and 60-64.  We further
divide women into ages 40-44 and 45-49 because pregnancy is assumed to occur only in the first
group.
5The reason that the payroll tax rate is additive in the denominator is that the employer is
indifferent between purchasing one dollar of benefits or paying wages of 1/(1+ ss + mc), since
each dollar of wages requires a payroll tax payment as well.
where k indexes single year age groups of children, and broader age groups for adults.
4  SPENDk
is the expected health spending in a year for that age group based on data from the 1987 National
Medical Expenditure Survey (NMES); the appendix to Cutler and Gruber (1996) presents these
figures.
The second prediction of the imperfect sorting model is that premium sharing should fall
with the relative subsidy to employer spending on insurance.  We test this hypothesis by
computing the tax price of insurance for workers, which measures the tax subsidy to insurance
purchase through the firm.  This is computed as:
(1) TP =  (1 - f - s - ss - mc)
                 (1 + ss + mc )
where f is the federal income tax marginal rate; s is the state income tax marginal rate; ss is the
marginal payroll tax rate for the OASDI program; and MC is the marginal payroll tax rate for the
Medicare HI program.
5  We differentiate the latter two programs because, beginning in the early
1990s, the taxable maximum for the HI program was increased above that for the OASDI
program (and was eventually removed altogether); the marginal rate is zero above the taxable
maximum for payroll taxation.  As the tax price of insurance rises (or as tax rates fall), there will
be less pressure to pay for insurance through the firm, and therefore more premium sharing as a
means of dealing with imperfect worker sorting.16
6For more information about TAXSIM, see Feenberg and Coutts (1993).  A public use
version of TAXSIM is available at www.nber.org/taxsim .  Marginal rates are computed by first
computing the tax bill, then adding $1000 to earned income and recomputing the tax bill, and
taking the difference divided by $1000.
To compute the marginal tax rate for each worker, we use the NBER’s TAXSIM model,
which inputs information on the major elements of taxable income and computes both a federal
and state marginal tax rate.
6  Virtually all of the elements of taxable income that we need are
reported in the CPS, with the major exception of any information on the itemization behavior of
the household.  We therefore used data from the Statistics of Income (SOI) data to impute both
the odds of itemization and the amount itemized by state and family earnings level.  For each
person, we compute their tax rate as a non-itemizer, and as an itemizer with average itemization
equal to the imputed amount from the SOI. We then take a weighted average of the resulting tax
rates, where the weights are the predicted rate of itemization based on state and earnings. 
The third prediction of the imperfect sorting model is that premium sharing should rise as
premium costs increase, since this raises the value of sorting.  Once again, we do not know the
firm’s actual insurance costs.  Thus, as a proxy for insurance costs, we measure average spending
on medical care per capita by state, from the Health Care Financing Administration.
Finally, we consider the role of cyclical conditions.  This factor is not addressed in
theoretical models of premium sharing, which are full employment models.  But there are a
variety of rent-sharing theories which suggest that firms and workers share in the benefits of firm
success (and the costs of firm failure); Budd and Slaughter (2000) provide a review of this
literature and some convincing new evidence.  If there is rent sharing in wages, then there may
also be rent sharing through health insurance contributions as well.  Alternatively, another link17
between health insurance contributions and economic conditions could be employee recruitment. 
To the extent that potential employees pay particular attention to whether they have to contribute
to their health insurance plan at a prospective new firm, and do not understand that it is likely
that lower contributions for insurance also generally will imply lower wages, when the labor
market is tight firms may choose to pay all of the costs of insurance.  But, as unemployment
rises, there is less pressure on firms to use low employee contributions as a recruitment tool. 
Thus, we include in the model the state/year unemployment rate, from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics, to capture cyclical effects on premium sharing decisions.
Identification Concerns
While each of the measures laid out above captures the influences of these factors on
employer behavior, the measures suffer from two important potential limitations.  The first is
measurement error; these are very noisy proxies for the characteristics of a given worker’s firm.
The second is omitted variables bias.  For each of these measures, there are potential correlates of
both the measures and the firm’s insurance decisions that could bias estimated relationships.  A
critical omitted variable is firm-specific economic shocks.  For example, if a given firm is subject
to a downturn, then both wages and employer contributions for health insurance may fall.  A
decline in wages will also lead to a decline in tax rates and therefore the subsidy to employer-
provided spending, to a rise in Medicaid eligibility, and potentially to a rise in spousal labor
supply, biasing all three of these coefficients in favor of finding the expected explanatory role for
contribution shifts.
To address these concerns, we use instrumental variables for the first three of our18
measures.  For spousal labor supply, we instrument actual spousal work with predicted spousal
work using the characteristics of the spouse.  That is, we estimate in each year a model of labor
supply (separately) for married women and married men as a function of age, race, education,
and interactions of these variables.  We then use the resulting coefficients to form a predicted
measure of work for each spouse of each worker in our sample, and use this as our instrument. 
In our regression models, we control for the spouse’s age, education and race directly.  So this
instrument is identified only by interactions of race and age, race and education, and age and
education, and interactions of all of these with year of survey.  All of these seem plausibly
exogenous to the premium contribution of a given employee.
For Medicaid eligibility, we follow Cutler and Gruber (1996) in instrumenting the
Medicaid Expenditure Share with a “simulated” MES.  This is computed by using a measure of
“simulated” Medicaid eligibility.  To create this measure, we first select a random sample of 250
married families and 250 single persons in each decile of their marital-status specific income
distributions in each year’s CPS.  These same 5000 observations are then assigned to each state,
and the relevant odds of Medicaid eligibility are computed for each family in the sample.  The
average MES is then computed for each income decile/marital status/state/year cell, and this is
used as an instrument for all persons in that cell.  
This instrument varies only by income decile by marital status, state, and year.  Each of
these factors is controlled for linearly in the model, so that identification comes only from their
interactions.  Thus, this instrument purges any omitted variables bias other than that arising
potentially from those interactions.  One obvious concern with this approach is that there may be
changes in employee premium sharing by income group over time.  Thus, in the basic model we19
also include a full set of income decile by marital status by year interactions.  Another concern is
that there may be time trends by state that are correlated with factors such as HMO penetration,
and likewise correlated with employers’ decisions on premium contributions.  To control for
such time trends, we include in the model a set of interactions between each state dummy and a
linear time trend variable. 
For our measure of the tax subsidy, we use a similar approach.  We once again draw a
national sample of families by income by marital status, and assign them to every state in that
year.  We then use that sample to compute tax prices, and use the average by income decile by
marital status*state*year cell as our instrument.
For our remaining measures, managed care penetration, medical spending, and
unemployment, we do not have readily available instruments.  For unemployment, this is not
likely to be an important issue, as the state/year unemployment rate can reasonably be taken as
exogenous to the firm’s decision on premium sharing.  But this is a more important issue for our
other measures. 
For medical spending, the reverse causality may arise because rising employee
contributions cause falling medical spending by making employees more sensitive to the cost of
medical care.  Fortunately for us, however, this biases against the hypothesis of interest, which is
that higher medical costs lead to more employee contributions, so if we find the hypothesized
relationship it should be convincing.  For managed care penetration, the reverse causality may
arise because managed care plans may choose to expand in places where employees pay a larger
share of their premiums, since they will be most successful in such price sensitive environments. 
This bias is more problematic because it goes directly in favor of the hypothesis we are20
attempting to test.  
Regression Framework
We will incorporate these measures of interest into a regression framework of the
following form:
(3) Ykjt = α + β1HMOjt + β2SPLSkjt + β3MESkjt + β4TPkjt + β5SPENDjt + β6UNEMjt 
+ β7Xkjt + β8ηj + β9τt +  β10ηj*TIME + ε
where k indexes individuals, j indexes states, and t indexes years; Y is one of our insurance
measures; HMO is our managed care penetration measure; SPLS is average spousal labor supply
for the cell; MES is the average Medicaid Eligible Share for the cell; TP is the average tax price
for the cell; SPEND is state/year medical spending; UNEM is the state/year unemployment rate;
X is a set of individual covariates; and ηj, and τt are sets of fixed effects for state, and year,
respectively.  The individual covariates in the model include own and spouse’s age, race, and
education; sex, marital status, and an interaction of these; occupation dummies; a set of 10
income decile dummies for married and 10 for single persons; interactions of these 20 income by
marital status dummies with year dummies; and a separate linear time trend for each state
(ηj*TIME).
Our key regressor is whether your employer pays all of the cost of your health insurance.
For each of the coefficients β1 through β6, the hypothesis is that the coefficient of interest will be
negative; each of these factors is hypothesized to raise premium sharing with employees.  The
impacts on whether the employer pays some of the cost of insurance are ambiguous.  On the one
hand, if employers are moving from paying all of the contributions to paying some, then these21
coefficients should all be positive when the dependent variable is employer pays some of the
cost.  On the other hand, to the extent that employers react to these forces by moving from paying
some of the costs to none of the costs, then the coefficient may be negative.  Moreover, it is
important to recall that we are using unconditional measures of premium sharing here.  So if
employers are reacting to these forces by simultaneously reducing insurance coverage and
premium sharing, then there could be reductions in both the “employer pays all” and “employer
pays some” coefficients; the reduction in the latter would reflect the net of shifting to employees
and dropping insurance altogether.  
The means of our data are presented in Table 2.  62% of our sample of workers has health
insurance coverage through their own employer.  For roughly 2/5 of these workers, the employer
pays all of the cost of insurance; for the other 3/5, the employer pays some, with very few
employees having employers who pay none of the costs of insurance.  On average over our
sample period, 12% of the privately insured are in HMOs, although this figure is rising rapidly
over time.  Only 3% of Medical spending for our full sample is eligible for Medicaid on average,
although this figure is once again rising rapidly.  Roughly half of spouses work, and on average
the tax subsidy to insurance is about one-third of the price of insurance (a tax price of insurance,
relative to wages, of 0.65).  Medical spending per capita in the states averages $2450, and the
average unemployment rate is 7%.22
Part IV: Results
Basic Results
Our basic regression results are shown in Table 3.  The first three columns show the
results for the odds that the employer pays all, some, or none of the cost of insurance.  The
coefficients across these columns need not add to zero because these are unconditional measures;
rather, the coefficients add to the net change in insurance coverage induced by that factor.  The
final column therefore shows the impact on having coverage at all through your employer.  All
regressions are estimated as linear probability models for consistency of our instrumental
variables estimates; results are similar if probit models are used instead.  The standard errors are
corrected for within state-year clustering.
The most striking feature of the first column of Table 3 is that all of our predictors have
the expected (negative) sign; in every case, a stronger incentive for more premium sharing
reduces the odds that employers pay all of the cost of insurance.  This is a striking confirmation
of the role of economic incentives in this employer decision.
But only four of the six coefficients are statistically significant.  The first coefficient of
interest is that on HMO penetration.  There is a negative impact of HMO penetration on premium
sharing, indicating that for each 10 percentage point rise in HMO penetration, the share of
employers paying all of the cost of health insurance falls by 0.74 percentage points.  There is a
corresponding rise in the share of employers paying some of the cost, with little effect on overall
coverage.  But none of these coefficients are significant, and the impacts are substantively quite
small; the elasticity of full employer financing of insurance with respect to managed care23
7In the context of Medicaid, the available evidence suggests that the overall reduction in
coverage arises mostly from a reduction in insurance takeup conditional on offering, not from
reduced employer offering.
penetration is less than 0.04.  Thus, the results here confirm the intuition from Levy’s (1997)
facts: the fixed subsidy model cannot explain much of the time trend in premium sharing.
The next two coefficients of interest are those on Medicaid and on spousal labor supply. 
Both show sizeable and highly significant negative impacts on the odds that an employer pays all
of the cost of health insurance, which is consistent with the contention of the imperfect sorting
model that raising outside insurance options will lead to more premium sharing.  In the case of
Medicaid, the results indicate that for each 10 percentage points increase in the Medicaid eligible
share, the share of employers paying all of the cost of insurance falls by 1.7 percentage points. 
There is a corresponding 0.77 percentage point rise in the share of employers paying some of the
cost and a 0.28 percentage point rise in the share paying none of the cost.  In addition, there is a
0.64 percentage point decline in the odds that the individual is covered at all by employer-
provided insurance (which is consistent with the “crowdout” results in Cutler and Gruber
(1996)).
The fact that there is some reduction in total insurance coverage makes interpretation of
the impacts on premium sharing somewhat difficult, because without longitudinal data we can
not infer the premium sharing arrangement that existed for those losing (or dropping) coverage.
7 
A conservative assumption would be that those that lost or dropped coverage were distributed
across the all/some/none categories in proportion to the full sample.  This is conservative since it
seems likely that those firms that would drop coverage in response to Medicaid expansions, or
those workers that would stop taking up, would be much more likely to come from the pool of24
8It is interesting to note that while we find that higher levels of spousal labor supply
reduce the odds of own insurance coverage, we find no effects on the odds of having any
employer-provided coverage.  Thus, it appears that when spouses work, they reduce the insurance
coverage on their spouse’s job, but equally raise the odds of insurance through their own job.
firms paying some or none of the costs of insurance, not from the pool of firms paying all of the
cost.
Under this assumption, 38% of those employees losing coverage previously were in jobs
where the employer paid all of the costs of insurance, 57% were in jobs where the employer paid
some of the costs, and 5% were in jobs where the employer paid none of the costs.  These
proportions would suggest that 0.24% of the 1.77% reduction in employers paying all comes
from reduced coverage, so that on net a 10% rise in Medicaid entitlement led to a 1.53% shift
from employers paying all of the cost of insurance to employers paying some or none.  But this is
likely a lower bound, for the reasons noted above.
For spousal labor supply, there is a 1% reduction in the odds of an employer paying all of
the costs of insurance for each 10% rise in the odds of having a working spouse.  But there is an
even larger 1.2% decline in the odds of an employer paying some of the cost, with little effect on
the odds of paying none of the cost, for a total reduction in employer coverage of 2.2%.  In this
case, interpreting the impact on actual changes in premium sharing is more difficult.  But under
the conservative assumption that coverage reductions are in proportion to the initial shares of
premium contributions, then there is a slight shift in financing of roughly 0.1% for each 10% rise
in spousal labor supply.  Thus, there is a wide range of possible impacts of spousal labor supply
on premium sharing decisions of firms, but in any case the estimated impact appears fairly
small.
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The fourth row shows the impact of the tax price.  Once again, as with the case of spousal
labor supply, here we find negative effects on paying all and on paying some of the cost of
insurance, and even a significant negative impact on the odds of paying none of the cost, with a
resultant very sizeable decline in overall insurance coverage; this result mirrors the price
sensitivity of employer-provided insurance coverage documented in Gruber and Lettau (2000)
and Gruber (2002).  Once again, this overall negative impact makes interpretation somewhat
difficult.  Under the conservative assumption used thus far, each 10% increase in the tax price
leads to a 1.7% shift from employers paying all of the costs of insurance to employers paying
some or none.  So the impact of tax changes on premium sharing appears quite large; the effect
varies from 1.7% to 3.7% per each 10% change in tax price.
The fifth row shows the effect of state/year medical costs; the coefficient is that on the
level of costs divided by 1000.  We find here a negative, but not significant, relationship between
medical costs and premium sharing.
Finally, there is a very significant negative effect of the unemployment rate on the odds
that the employer pays all of the cost of insurance.  This coefficient indicates that for a 10
percentage point rise in the unemployment rate, 1.7 percent fewer firms pay all of the cost of
insurance.  There is a rise in the odds of a firm paying some or none of the cost of insurance by
0.5 percent, and an overall reduction in coverage of 1.2 percent.  Thus, under the conservative
approach pursued thus far, we say that each 10 percent rise in unemployment leads to a 1.2 to 1.7
percent reduction in the odds that an employer pays all of the costs of insurance.26
Endogenous Incomes
We argued above that our instruments likely purged these models of omitted variables
bias, because our instruments only vary by income group, marital status, state, and year, and we
are controlling for main effects of all four factors, as well as interactions of income, marital
status, and year.  But there is an additional concern that is not addressed by this approach:
endogeneity of income groups.  The consensus in the health economics literature is that there is
full or close to full shifting of health insurance costs to wages (Gruber, 2000).  As a result, if
firms change their insurance contributions, that should be reflected in wages, which will in turn
feed back to our instruments.  This creates a problematic endogenous correlation between our
instruments and the dependent variables in these models.
We have addressed this endogeneity concern by recreating our instruments using not
actual income but predicted income.  That is, we predict income for each household as a function
of age, sex, race, education, sex*education, sex*race, race*education, and dummies for number
of children.  We then use these predictions to create predicted income deciles, and classify
households based on these predicted income deciles for the purposes of making our instruments. 
This approach results in instruments which are free of the potential endogeneity bias from using
actual incomes, although they are also, by definition, less efficient.
The results of using this alternative IV approach are shown in Table 4.  As would be
expected, there is relatively little impact on the regressors where there was no change in
instruments; the coefficient in the “employer pays all” regression is down somewhat for spousal
labor supply, and up for the unemployment rate.  There is also remarkably little impact of this
instrument on the Medicaid coefficient on premium sharing, although the overall coverage27
coefficient is now insignificant.  There is a much larger impact on the tax price coefficient, which
has almost doubled in size.  This is partly due to a larger overall effect on insurance coverage,
and partly due to a larger concentration of the effect in the employer pays all (rather than the
employer pays some) category.  Using the same type of calculation that we pursued above, we
now estimate that for each 10% rise in the tax price, there is a 3% reduction in the odds that
employers pay all of the costs of health insurance, a quite large effect.
Implications for Time Series Trends
Our paper began with the question of what factors can explain the time series trend in
rising employer contributions for health insurance.  We can now return to this question by
applying our estimated coefficients to the time series trends in our key independent variables, and
comparing the predicted time series trends that result to the actual trend in premium contributions
by employers.
The results of doing so are presented in Figure 4. The figure shows two lines, which have
been rescaled so that the time patterns can be easily compared.  The first line is the actual time
trend in the share of employers paying all of the cost of insurance.  The second line is the
predicted time trend, based on the time trend in our six key independent variables, times the
coefficients of each in our basic Table 3 regression.
There is a remarkably close correspondence between the time series in the actual and
predicted time series.  The key features of the time series are replicated here: a slow decline
through 1985, a much more rapid decline through 1992, and then a flattening in the mid-1990s. 
The figure is very similar if, instead, the conditional share of firms paying all of insurance costs28
is compared to the implied conditional effects from our regressions (e.g. using our conservative
assumption above to obtain the impact on premium shifting).
While the correspondence between the series is close over time, however, the magnitudes
implied by our model are not large enough to explain the overall time series shift.  In Table 5, we
illustrate this by dividing our data into three periods: 1982-1985; 1985-1992; and 1992-1996. 
From 1982-1985, the share of employers paying all of the cost of health insurance fell by 2.2
percentage points.  The predicted decline from our model was 0.4 percentage points, or 18% as
large a decline.  From 1986-1992, the share of employers paying all of the cost fell by 9.8
percentage points.  The predicted decline 2.7 percentage points, or 28% as large a decline.  From
1993-1996, the share of employers paying all of the costs fell by 0.7 percentage points.  The
prediction over this period was acutally a rise of 0.3 percentage points.  Over the entire period,
the actual decline was 12.8 percentage points, and the predicted decline was 2.8 percentage
points, or 22% as large a decline.  Thus, we conclude that the factors in our model match fairly
well the time series pattern of employer contributions, but that they can only explain about a
quarter of the overall movements over this period.
Part V: Conclusions
The large and growing literature on the determinants of health insurance coverage of the
U.S. population has been focused primarily on the decision of employers to offer health
insurance.  But there is a growing recognition in health economics that employee takeup
decisions may be the more important margin for explaining the large declines in coverage that we
have witnessed over the past two decades.  This contention is bolstered by the fact that there was29
such an enormous shift in premium costs from employers to employees over this time period. 
Yet, to date, there has been no explanation for this dramatic and potentially important trend.
In this paper, we have investigated six possible determinants of this trend, drawing on the
theoretical arguments for why, in the face of tax subsidized employer premiums, employers
would shift premium costs to employees.  Five of these six determinants (spousal labor supply
being the exception) also have the attractive feature that the incentives for employee financing
grow most rapidly in exactly the time period when the shift to employee financing was most
pronounced, the late 1980s and early 1990s.  We find that, for all six factors, we obtain the
expected relationship with employee financing, although this relationship is only significant in
four of the six cases.  In terms of timing of changes over this period, these factors do an excellent
job.  But, in terms of the overall trend over this period, they explain less than one-quarter.
These findings, particularly the strong effect for tax incentives, suggest that premium
financing is a price sensitive decision for firms.  This implies that policies that subsidize the
employer-provision of health insurance may not only increase insurance offering, but also reduce
the burden of premium payments for employees.  This provides an additional factor that must be
included in cost-benefit analysis of employer versus individual subsidies as a means of
expanding insurance coverage.
These results also raise two further research questions.  First, what other factors explain
the trend towards increased employee premium sharing over this period?  Future research with
data that has more continuous measures of premium sharing should be employed to understand
more fully this important trend.  Second, what are the implications of these rising employee
contributions?  As noted earlier, the existing small literature on employee takeup suggests that it30
is not very price elastic, suggesting that this premium shift has only distributional consequences. 
But further work is needed to confirm or refute this contention. 31
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Table 1: Comparison of CPS and BLS Data on Percent of Employees Contributing to their
Plans
Year CPS All EBS Medium/Large CPS Medium/Large
Family Single Family Single Family Single
1981 54% 48%
1982 54% 47%
1983 55% 48% 54% 33%
1984 56% 49%
1985 56% 49% 56% 36%
1986 57% 50%
1987 58% 49% 62% 55%
1988 58% 50% 64% 44% 63% 56%
1989 61% 52% 66% 58%
1990 63% 53% 68% 60%
1991 65% 57% 69% 51% 70% 65%
1992 67% 60% 73% 67%
1993 67% 59% 76% 61% 73% 67%
1994 ... .... .... ....
1995 66% 60% 78% 67% 73% 67%
1996 70% 60% 75% 68%
1997 69% 60% 80% 69% 75% 68%
1998 70% 63% 76% 70%34
Table 2: Means
Variable Mean Standard Deviation
Own Group Coverage 0.62 0.48
Employer Pays All 0.24 0.43
Employer Pays Some 0.36 0.48
Employer Pays None 0.03 0.17
Manage Care Penetration 0.12 0.09
Spousal Labor Supply 0.46 0.50
Medicaid Eligible Share 0.03 0.12




Unemployment Rate 0.07 0.02
Number of Obs 850,541 850,54135



































































Number of Obs 850,541 850,541 850,541 850,541
Note: Dependent variable listed in top row.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions also
include controls for: own and spouse’s age, race, and education; sex, marital status, and an
interaction of these; occupation dummies; a set of 10 income decile dummies for married and 10
for single persons; interactions of these 20 income by marital status dummies with year
dummies; state and year fixed effects; and a separate linear time trend for each state.36



































































Number of Obs 850,541 850,541 850,541 850,541
Note: Dependent variable listed in top row.  Standard errors in parentheses.  Regressions also
include controls for: own and spouse’s age, race, and education; sex, marital status, and an
interaction of these; occupation dummies; a set of 10 income decile dummies for married and 10
for single persons; interactions of these 20 income by marital status dummies with year
dummies; state and year fixed effects; and a separate linear time trend for each state.37
Table 5: Comparing Predicted vs. Actual Trends
Time Period Actual Predicted
1982-1985 - 2.2 % - 0.4%
1985-1992 - 9.8 % - 2.7%
1992-1996 - 0.7 % 0.3 %
















Figure 1: Percent of Workers with Group Health Insurance
year













































 % with Group HI  % whose Employers Pay All





































Figure 3: Comparison of CPS and KPMG Premium Sharing
% of Family Premiums Paid by Employer in KPMG






















































 Employer Pays All  Predicted Employer Pays All
1982 1996
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-.307586